Democracy and the Learning Society

Today I will summarize Chapter 9 of the Jarvis book entitled.....well....it's right there in the title above, so that's good enough!

He starts by explaining that studies by Ranson (1994) and Welton (2005) show that a learning society should be both just and democratic.  So, this chapter intends to discuss democracy and access how realizable it is in a GC culture.  

A point of form here:  I have been using the term:  GC Culture much more than Jarvis has.  He tends to use "modernity" and "GC society."  However, I thought that the point he was making in Chapter 5 (blogged earlier) was that Global Capitalism IS a culture and that this is the context in which we are exploring the learning society, lifelong learning and democracy.  The point seemed central to his ongoing arguments, so I think it appropriate to continue to use the term 'culture' to keep that point in mind.  

THE CONCEPT OF DEMOCRACY

  

Before summarizing Jarvis here, I will share an anecdote related to the conceptualization of democracy.  In MS Word, I did a clip-art search for images of "democracy."  The results were pictures of: 

• a ballot box
• the supreme court of the USA
• American fore-fathers apparently in debate, although the title is "the American Revolution"
•  a cartoon depiction of a congress building 
•  a grandfather and granddaughter signing some piece of paper
•  two children (white) in front of the US flag

This gave me pause to wonder what people think democracy is?  Similarly, I did a search with google images. Most of the results for democracy were cartoons depicting national and international political problems. (one of them showed a US bomber plane dropping its payload with the caption:  Come to Democracy or Democracy will come to you!)   But a review of the comics shows no consistent idea of what democracy is.  At best....it's standing in line to vote. 

Jarvis starts by quoting Dewey (1916, p. 87) to illustrate that democracy is

"more than a form of government; it is primarily a mode of associated living..." (p. 164)

He then goes through an inconclusive back-and-forth in which he argues who should have the right to participate in a democracy and how that is related to learning and education.  

For example: 

• In ancient Greece, only land-owning male citizens could participate in debates in the agora
• Should there be a minimum education required for people to participate in democracy (participation not really defined, but I assume he means both voting and engaging in public debate) to ensure that those participating are well-informed? 
• Acknowledgement that education does not equal informed status, nor does it assure rational or reasonable decisions or wisdom by any definition. 
• What educational/experiential requirements should be on leaders in a democracy? 

He presents Lively's (1975, p. 30) possible forms of rule in democracy:

1. all should govern
2. all should be involved in crucial decision making
3. Rulers should be accountable to the ruled.
4. rulers should be accountable to the representatives of the ruled
5. rulers should be chosen by the ruled
6. rulers should be chosen by the representatives of the ruled
7. rulers should act in the best interest of the ruled. 

Jarvis argues that the further up the list you go, the more unrealistic such rule would be in a GC Culture specifically, and in a large diverse society in general.  

Even as we go down the list, we see problems:  how does a ruler act in the best interest of a diverse and dynamic population?  Rulers can lose sight of the people they represent and act in the interests of the party or of the substructure that has power to exercise influence on them. 
One general problem Jarvis highlights is that there is an implication that whatever the majority want, that must be the right thing to do.  It doesn't take much knowledge of history to come up with compelling arguments against that logic.  So, it begs the question:  if democracy is more-or-less a numbers game, what hope is there for justice?  Jarvis says there is

...need for a moral framework for democracy...(p. 166) 

Jarvis looks to Rawls' (1971, 1999) political theory of justice for that:  Justice as Fairness.

Jarvis argues that 

"...the equality of humanity can only exist within the limits of the political and moral realms:  globalisation has enabled those with economic power to by-pass the political and moral processes in many countries and has privileged the wealthy and has rendered politicians and the arbitrators of morality relatively powerless in certain areas of everyday life. (p. 167).

He asks if political power can sufficiently restrain/control/influence/buffer/cushion (he uses the word "control" but I think other options may be more appropriate) economic power?
A question he doesn't ask, (and I think it is because he thinks he has already answered it sufficiently, or that it's so obvious that it need not be answered, but I do not agree) is whether or not political power needs to control economic power?    I think that is a fair and necessary question to ask.  Even if the answer is "yes!" then it needs to be answered. It is precisely because my gut instinct is that the answer is yes that I need this question asked and answered.   If the answer is "no"....well then, it REALLY needs to be asked! 

Jarvis points out that an apathy about political engagement has been developing.  He assigns the cause to GC Culture:  

" ...if the people's desires are satiated by what they are offered in the market, then there appear to be fewer reasons to participate in the political process..." (p. 167).

Again, the GC culture may or may not be the reasons for political apathy.  I don't think it fair to ascribe this as THE cause, but perhaps suggest that it might be A cause.  I personally find that time is the biggest factor keeping me from being more politically aware.  Indeed, you can say that it is possible that GC culture has some influence on the little time that I have, but it too would not be the only factor.  

He does claim (although I think it more appropriate to make this a suggestion) that in a liberal modernity (and by this, I'm going to assume he means a culture in which the individual is fronted in place of the group), "people only get involved in the political process when their own individual interests are threatened." (p. 167)

I am personally struggling with a concept of 'critical mass' here.  My reflections are that I don't think 100% participation is necessary (or possible/desirable) for a healthy democracy.  So, if we are worried about apathy and lack of participation, it must be important to identify a level at which participation is too low for democracy to function as planned.  What is that level?  When Jarvis talks about lack of participation and the need to ensure participation, he doesn't address this level.  But he claims (or seems to) that participation is a problem, that we are below that critical level (or are in danger of going below it).  He talks about "people" only getting involved when their individual interests are threatened as though "people" means everyone.   That is simply not true.  Some "people" are politically involved for interests of the Other.  Depending on how you define "involved" one might be able to argue that a great many people are so involved.  I do not argue against the idea that as apathy and lack of participation increases, democracy is unrealisable.  But I do question the implicit assumption that we have now, or are in danger of, reaching that critical mass."  

Jarvis then describes 3 models of democracy: 

1. liberal democracy -- the legal order is based on the individual and his or her rights. Political power comes by convincing individuals that you will support their individual interests.  Jarvis suggests that this is reflective of the market: a struggle of individual interests. 
2. republican democracy -- politics is rooted in the notion of community, inter-dependence and ethical living.  It requires an active public sphere, not just in order for individuals to voice their individual preferences, but in order to debate and consider ethics and justice and the collective good.  There is social and not just individual identity.  Would require a learning society for just decisions. 
3. Deliberative democracy -- positioned as a middle ground (although leaning toward republicanism) between liberal and republican democracy.  It finds validation for decisions in public deliberation and public consultation. It respects a diverse polity and seeks to combine human rights with communitarian spirit.  Rawls (1999) suggests that it requires public reason, democratic institutions, and a polity with the knowledge and desire to follow public reason through deliberation. This form of democratic order would also require a learning society.

Jarvis has thus positioned 3 forms of democracy to illustrate that the one most in line with GC Culture (of individualism) is the one least directly linked to a need for a learning society.  


Jarvis spends some time exploring Rawls' theory of democracy.  He claims that the market represents "a degree of abstract equality" but "without according equality of anything other than rights to the individual" (p. 171).  Jarvis claims that Rawls' conception is a realistic utopia and he describes the 6 conditions for Rawls' utopia: 

1. Justice must be realistic (actual, stable laws)
2. Justice must be Utopian (high moral principles of justice)
3. Everything needed for a political conception of justice must be in the political system. 
4. There must be institutions in which citizens can develop a sense of social justice. 
5. Unity of the polity is rooted in the conception of justice
6. There should be tolerance. 

The fourth point indicates a need for a learning society.  Public reason is essential.  It represents moral and political dimensions and informs how citizens relate to the government (and vice versa) and to other citizens. This can only happen when citizens can put themselves in the place of the decision makers, and only if they possess the knowledge and rationality.

Deliberative democracy also recognizes that without widespread education in the basic aspects of constitutional democratic government for all citizens, and without a public informed about pressing problems, crucial political and social decisions cannot be made" (Rawls, 1999, p. 139). (p. 172). 

But justice through fairness can only happen if the political realm has the power to enact it.  Jarvis says it does not, and therefore, this is an unrealistic utopia. 

I must say that it is one thing to say that there are significant powers outside of politics.  But it is another to say that politics is powerless.  And Jarvis, in my reading, is approaching saying that politics has no power.  

Although criticisms have been launched against deliberative politics, (justice and goodness are not the same, reasonableness is not truth, not everyone shares this view, etc.)  Jarvis proposes that 

It is in deliberative politics and practical reason that we find a basis for the learning society and lifelong learning.  (p. 174).

One of the issues that I'm considering at this point involves the direction from which Jarvis is addressing the relationship between politics and LLL.   What he is doing is assuming LLL to be a good and a goal and is asking which political concepts will serve as a basis for this.   In fact, LLL (in one definition) is being promoted and called for as never before BECAUSE of the contexts (economic more than political, although political is involved) in which we are living.  Chicken and egg?   
I can find some terms on which to address the difference.  Primarily, it is in what we choose to call a learning society.  It occurs to me throughout this reading that the term as it stands is useless.  Everyone means something different by it.  I think at least what is needed is a mandatory adjective.  I can think of at least 3 completely different visions of the learning society as it is being presented in this volume:

1. The political learning society.  As is being discussed in this section.  It is a society that engages its citizens with the knowledge, skills and opportunities to participate in the political.  It is considered an obvious good and is hoped to lead to justice and therefore, is something that we should try to develop.  Different political systems have different relationships to this idea of a learning society, and different mechanisms by which it might be achieved.  We want to get there.

2. The indoctrination learning society.  This is the passive learning society that Jarvis was suggesting is happening, whether we like it or not, when advertising and other forms of  uni-directional messages bombard citizens resulting in value and desire (re)creation in line with GC culture and consumerism.  This is something that we want to avoid, but according to Jarvis, are already involved in.  We are there.

3. The Employability/skills learning society.  Jarvis made some, but less reference to this learning society.  However, it is a major part of critical discourse on LLL and the KBE and is found well represented in policy documents such as those prepared by OECD and World Bank.  In this learning society, individual workers are saddled with the responsibility to continuously upgrade their skills or risk social exclusion and de-valuation in the labour market.  One author (whose reference I temporarily forget) referred to this as a state of perpetual inadequacy.  Policy is calling on workers to be responsible citizens and become the most skilled workers in the world so that they can help to advance the economies of the countries, regions and institutions in which they work.  While doing so, in terms relative to the industries, they receive little reward for their added efforts.  We are on the road, but don't want to get there. 

Before his final summary, Jarvis does take time to position new media technologies such as the Web as a cite of learning and an opportunity for an expansion of the agora and of civil society.  He suggest that these technologies may be offering new ways in which information can be shared, opinions voiced, debate enacted and deliberations expanded.  He reminds us that if these technologies are going to be successful in enhancing deliberative democracy, there will need to be mechanisms by which the resulting deliberations get fed into the political process. As these products become more ubiquitous, more will have access to this form of participation.   Jarvis does not raise the issue that only those with access and resources currently can involve themselves in this way.  Until then, other modes of participation are still needed.  And he also does not bring up what I believe is an important, if not ironic, point: 

If we do look to technologies such as the Web to provide a mechanism to breathe new life into deliberative democracy, are we not obliged to ask the path by which such technologies can become common place?  Will it not require the production, promotion and sales of computers to more people?  Will it not require that individuals will have to be persuaded to work hard and purchase these items?   Is it not ironic that, according to Jarvis, democracy is threatened by neo-liberal GC culture, and yet, a major solution for its health is a product of that neo-liberal GC culture? 

Just thinking out loud here.....I'd love to hear some other thoughts!

In the next chapter and blog, Jarvis will explore Utopian thought itself since he has positioned that the learning society is Utopian, and he hopes to later explore the type of learning contemporary society demands.