LLL and the Learning Society as a Useful Utopia

The chapter I am summarizing today is entitled “Utopia deferred”

Jarvis begins by saying that humanity has always been concerned with why we do not have a perfect society. Much of this is related to the problem of

How free individuals with individual interests can live together peacefully?

Or

How society can remain united when individuals seek to advance their own interests?

 Before the Enlightenment, religious myths provided answers in the form of Utopias.  These Utopias were located outside of history, before and beyond human experience.  Two examples are the Garden of Eden and the City of God. 

After the Enlightenment a “multitude” (p. 180) of Utopian beliefs emerged, especially among the poor, to address this same problem.  These too were beyond history and one example is the City of Man. 

Jarvis posits that one can ask several questions about Utopias:

·         Are they a futile hope or a political aspiration?

·         Are they rooted in the community or the individual?

·         What is the role of education/learning in the road to Utopia?

This chapter aims to explore the latter question by first exploring the concept of Utopia and then reviewing political ideas about Utopias and educators’ Utopian ideas.

The Concept of Utopia

Utopia is a vision of the good society

·         It varies with culture

o   This plurality itself negates dominant Western ideals and implies a criticism of modernity

o   Communist, US Imperialist, GC cultures all envision different Utopias

·         Can be totalising under political power

o   I think perhaps Jarvis would suggest totality under extreme economic power too.

o   Soviet communism, US Imperialism, GC can/have been totalizing

Political Visions of Utopia

1.      Plato’s Republic

Even Plato appreciated that it wasn’t realizable.

Individuals would seek private property and it would collapse the Utopia

2.      Marx

A class-less society outside the bounds of time

3.      Rawls

Recognized Utopian vision as that which “extends what are ordinarily thought of as the limits to practical political possibility” (1999, p. 6) (p. 182)

His hope was that his vision (of justice as fairness) would “transcend the unrealistic…and offer a realistic model…” (p. 182).

Justice as conceived by Rawls and rooted in US liberalism cannot be universalized as a moral good.  Seeking to export it as universalizable is unwise.

The political myth of Utopia is unachievable.  But it may provide a vision for aspirations.

Fatal Flaws in Modern Economic Thought

·         Humans do not behave rationally all (most?) of the time.

o   Aspirations depending on rational action are not realizable

·         Economic rationality has produced its own Utopias

o   McTopia and other food-based visions of the “land of milk and honey”

·         Contemporary economics has not lead to Utopia

o   The wealthiest 1% control 24% of the wealth in Britain (Hunt, 2007).

o   Hunt suggests the UK is approaching Victorian levels of inequality.

o   The rich seldom “see” the poor since much poverty is international and those who are poor locally are clustering in areas not frequented by the rich.

I will add a personal anecdote.  Born of working-class Canadian parents, I never thought of myself as rich, and perhaps that is why I never thought much about the poor.  My ignorant-comfort was also protected by my pride in Canada.  I thought we were a rich country and surely didn’t have a poverty problem.   Then I moved to Vancouver, BC.  My first months kept me close to the University, so I saw a rich Canada still.  One day, I was taken on a drive by a fellow student into ‘the lower east side.’  I noticed the throngs of people standing around on the streets.  It looks like perhaps a concert was set to begin and people were waiting to get in.  And yet, there didn’t seem to be any order to their organization and there seemed to be no clear venue to which they were destined.  I asked the ignorant question:  “Why are all these people on the street?”  To this, my friend replied, “Where else can they go?”  It was only then that I realized that these were the homeless of Vancouver.  This was the poverty that was so rampant, even in my rich country, that was segregated out of my view.  I felt ill. 

Jarvis suggests that such underdevelopment and poverty are the result of GC and neo-liberal economics.  Seager (2007) says that globalization has reduced the bargaining power of unskilled workers to the point that even the OECD (a very neo-liberal organization) is recommending that governments have social safety nets for low-skilled workers.    A billion people live on less than a dollar a day (no reference given).  These people are redundant to the GC world.  GC is not working for everyone. 

I am reflecting on Jarvis’ apparent positioning as neo-liberalism as having been a utopian vision.  It seems to me from my reading that he is trying to say that the utopia of Neo-liberalism has not and cannot be realized. He seems to be assuming that neo-liberalism advanced because people thought it would prove to provide a better society.  But I wonder (and I admit my lack of understanding of the history behind this economic model) if neo-liberalism ever made that promise.  Prior to neo-liberalism being dominant, did anyone ever believe that neo-liberalism ought to be embraced for the purposes of improving society?  Did anyone ever make that argument a priori?  It seems to me more likely that economic rationalism is a positive feed-back loop that perpetuates and strengthens itself.  Without mechanisms to regulate it, we were almost bound to end up in the neo-liberal GC society that we have.  Those who are most likely to survive economically, will survive economically, and will support systems that support the economic survival of entities with similar characteristics. Rather Darwinian (please don’t read Darwinian to imply a teleology toward ‘better’), I have to admit.  It’s rather a form of natural selection, where selection in no way suggests selection of the morally ‘better’.  Once we have an upper-class that is doing well in neo-liberal GC culture, they of course will then find ways to justify the continuation of the program, and may do so by developing utopian visions from a (selective) neo-liberal palette.  But I am not sure that neo-liberalism started out as a strategy to move toward a Utopia of any kind, and that seems to be what Jarvis is suggesting.

Jarvis says that when finite resources make it clear that unlimited growth is not possible, the utopian visions of global capitalism will collapse. 

Not only has GC culture not lived up to values of good outside of its own paradigm (health, community, family, happiness, environmental) but it has also failed to live up to the one and only value within its paradigm:   wealth.  People are not economically (as a collective). 

One of Jarvis’ concerns is that when poverty hits a critical level and a critical mass, there is rebellion by violent means.  He describes that it is happening today in pockets, and when it does, the poor who rebel are being labelled as terrorists. 

Jarvis positions education and educators in an important political position because of the focus on LLL in GC culture but laments that

…there have been few voices in education that have protested at the social conditions that global capitalism has produced:  education has in many cases either been colonised by the sub-structure or it has sold out to it” (p. 186).

Ouch.

Although I admit new and limited exposure to academia in education, I have to say that so far my experiences within the University of British Columbia do not support this sentiment.  But I do agree that it is important for educators to be aware and involved.

Education’s Utopia:  The Learning Society

GC interests are involving itself in the provision of education.

But industry is also providing some education on its own as well.

Historically, there was liberal adult education and critical adult education.  Both had utopian ideas and held humanitarian ideals.

Contemporary LLL emerged more as an extension of schooling and has largely replaced liberal adult education.

“…a great deal of the education of adults in the West at the start of the twenty-first century can only be decried as an extension of global capitalism and learning is something demanded by the system and, as such it has no independent ideology—it merely reflects the demands of global capitalism.” (p. 186)

But the LLL and the learning society as a Utopia is still around with contemporary LLL which Jarvis has called a new social movement (p. 188). Jarvis sees LLL and the learning society as Utopian visions

·         It tells us that what we have isn’t good enough

·         It points us toward a better, although unachievable, future

but when formulated on the foundations of modernity, it is morally and socially undesirable.

The Education of Desire

Whereas education to desire more and bigger consumer goods is not favourable to Jarvis, he proposes that education to desire a different and better society is, er, uh, well, desirable.  

Utopias give us that desire.

Education has always had a role in socializing individuals into society to preserve society.

But education should also instil a desire to keep learning, not necessarily a desire for a Utopia.

Conclusion

Utopias are always unachievable and beyond history, but they have a valid role in directing us toward something better. 

Whereas a Utopia fashioned of neo-liberal values is flawed, one based on agapism (the concern for the other) is more universalizable and more robust in its possibilities of a better world.

We need to educate students to love learning, and only in that can we develop toward a utopia learning society rooted in morally acceptable values.

The next chapter entitled “ Back to the Beginning?” promises us some paradoxes.

Jarvis asks, if the Enlightenment is flawed, what do we do now?

Democracy and the Learning Society

Today I will summarize Chapter 9 of the Jarvis book entitled.....well....it's right there in the title above, so that's good enough!

He starts by explaining that studies by Ranson (1994) and Welton (2005) show that a learning society should be both just and democratic.  So, this chapter intends to discuss democracy and access how realizable it is in a GC culture.  

A point of form here:  I have been using the term:  GC Culture much more than Jarvis has.  He tends to use "modernity" and "GC society."  However, I thought that the point he was making in Chapter 5 (blogged earlier) was that Global Capitalism IS a culture and that this is the context in which we are exploring the learning society, lifelong learning and democracy.  The point seemed central to his ongoing arguments, so I think it appropriate to continue to use the term 'culture' to keep that point in mind.  

THE CONCEPT OF DEMOCRACY

  

Before summarizing Jarvis here, I will share an anecdote related to the conceptualization of democracy.  In MS Word, I did a clip-art search for images of "democracy."  The results were pictures of: 

• a ballot box
• the supreme court of the USA
• American fore-fathers apparently in debate, although the title is "the American Revolution"
•  a cartoon depiction of a congress building 
•  a grandfather and granddaughter signing some piece of paper
•  two children (white) in front of the US flag

This gave me pause to wonder what people think democracy is?  Similarly, I did a search with google images. Most of the results for democracy were cartoons depicting national and international political problems. (one of them showed a US bomber plane dropping its payload with the caption:  Come to Democracy or Democracy will come to you!)   But a review of the comics shows no consistent idea of what democracy is.  At best....it's standing in line to vote. 

Jarvis starts by quoting Dewey (1916, p. 87) to illustrate that democracy is

"more than a form of government; it is primarily a mode of associated living..." (p. 164)

He then goes through an inconclusive back-and-forth in which he argues who should have the right to participate in a democracy and how that is related to learning and education.  

For example: 

• In ancient Greece, only land-owning male citizens could participate in debates in the agora
• Should there be a minimum education required for people to participate in democracy (participation not really defined, but I assume he means both voting and engaging in public debate) to ensure that those participating are well-informed? 
• Acknowledgement that education does not equal informed status, nor does it assure rational or reasonable decisions or wisdom by any definition. 
• What educational/experiential requirements should be on leaders in a democracy? 

He presents Lively's (1975, p. 30) possible forms of rule in democracy:

1. all should govern
2. all should be involved in crucial decision making
3. Rulers should be accountable to the ruled.
4. rulers should be accountable to the representatives of the ruled
5. rulers should be chosen by the ruled
6. rulers should be chosen by the representatives of the ruled
7. rulers should act in the best interest of the ruled. 

Jarvis argues that the further up the list you go, the more unrealistic such rule would be in a GC Culture specifically, and in a large diverse society in general.  

Even as we go down the list, we see problems:  how does a ruler act in the best interest of a diverse and dynamic population?  Rulers can lose sight of the people they represent and act in the interests of the party or of the substructure that has power to exercise influence on them. 
One general problem Jarvis highlights is that there is an implication that whatever the majority want, that must be the right thing to do.  It doesn't take much knowledge of history to come up with compelling arguments against that logic.  So, it begs the question:  if democracy is more-or-less a numbers game, what hope is there for justice?  Jarvis says there is

...need for a moral framework for democracy...(p. 166) 

Jarvis looks to Rawls' (1971, 1999) political theory of justice for that:  Justice as Fairness.

Jarvis argues that 

"...the equality of humanity can only exist within the limits of the political and moral realms:  globalisation has enabled those with economic power to by-pass the political and moral processes in many countries and has privileged the wealthy and has rendered politicians and the arbitrators of morality relatively powerless in certain areas of everyday life. (p. 167).

He asks if political power can sufficiently restrain/control/influence/buffer/cushion (he uses the word "control" but I think other options may be more appropriate) economic power?
A question he doesn't ask, (and I think it is because he thinks he has already answered it sufficiently, or that it's so obvious that it need not be answered, but I do not agree) is whether or not political power needs to control economic power?    I think that is a fair and necessary question to ask.  Even if the answer is "yes!" then it needs to be answered. It is precisely because my gut instinct is that the answer is yes that I need this question asked and answered.   If the answer is "no"....well then, it REALLY needs to be asked! 

Jarvis points out that an apathy about political engagement has been developing.  He assigns the cause to GC Culture:  

" ...if the people's desires are satiated by what they are offered in the market, then there appear to be fewer reasons to participate in the political process..." (p. 167).

Again, the GC culture may or may not be the reasons for political apathy.  I don't think it fair to ascribe this as THE cause, but perhaps suggest that it might be A cause.  I personally find that time is the biggest factor keeping me from being more politically aware.  Indeed, you can say that it is possible that GC culture has some influence on the little time that I have, but it too would not be the only factor.  

He does claim (although I think it more appropriate to make this a suggestion) that in a liberal modernity (and by this, I'm going to assume he means a culture in which the individual is fronted in place of the group), "people only get involved in the political process when their own individual interests are threatened." (p. 167)

I am personally struggling with a concept of 'critical mass' here.  My reflections are that I don't think 100% participation is necessary (or possible/desirable) for a healthy democracy.  So, if we are worried about apathy and lack of participation, it must be important to identify a level at which participation is too low for democracy to function as planned.  What is that level?  When Jarvis talks about lack of participation and the need to ensure participation, he doesn't address this level.  But he claims (or seems to) that participation is a problem, that we are below that critical level (or are in danger of going below it).  He talks about "people" only getting involved when their individual interests are threatened as though "people" means everyone.   That is simply not true.  Some "people" are politically involved for interests of the Other.  Depending on how you define "involved" one might be able to argue that a great many people are so involved.  I do not argue against the idea that as apathy and lack of participation increases, democracy is unrealisable.  But I do question the implicit assumption that we have now, or are in danger of, reaching that critical mass."  

Jarvis then describes 3 models of democracy: 

1. liberal democracy -- the legal order is based on the individual and his or her rights. Political power comes by convincing individuals that you will support their individual interests.  Jarvis suggests that this is reflective of the market: a struggle of individual interests. 
2. republican democracy -- politics is rooted in the notion of community, inter-dependence and ethical living.  It requires an active public sphere, not just in order for individuals to voice their individual preferences, but in order to debate and consider ethics and justice and the collective good.  There is social and not just individual identity.  Would require a learning society for just decisions. 
3. Deliberative democracy -- positioned as a middle ground (although leaning toward republicanism) between liberal and republican democracy.  It finds validation for decisions in public deliberation and public consultation. It respects a diverse polity and seeks to combine human rights with communitarian spirit.  Rawls (1999) suggests that it requires public reason, democratic institutions, and a polity with the knowledge and desire to follow public reason through deliberation. This form of democratic order would also require a learning society.

Jarvis has thus positioned 3 forms of democracy to illustrate that the one most in line with GC Culture (of individualism) is the one least directly linked to a need for a learning society.  


Jarvis spends some time exploring Rawls' theory of democracy.  He claims that the market represents "a degree of abstract equality" but "without according equality of anything other than rights to the individual" (p. 171).  Jarvis claims that Rawls' conception is a realistic utopia and he describes the 6 conditions for Rawls' utopia: 

1. Justice must be realistic (actual, stable laws)
2. Justice must be Utopian (high moral principles of justice)
3. Everything needed for a political conception of justice must be in the political system. 
4. There must be institutions in which citizens can develop a sense of social justice. 
5. Unity of the polity is rooted in the conception of justice
6. There should be tolerance. 

The fourth point indicates a need for a learning society.  Public reason is essential.  It represents moral and political dimensions and informs how citizens relate to the government (and vice versa) and to other citizens. This can only happen when citizens can put themselves in the place of the decision makers, and only if they possess the knowledge and rationality.

Deliberative democracy also recognizes that without widespread education in the basic aspects of constitutional democratic government for all citizens, and without a public informed about pressing problems, crucial political and social decisions cannot be made" (Rawls, 1999, p. 139). (p. 172). 

But justice through fairness can only happen if the political realm has the power to enact it.  Jarvis says it does not, and therefore, this is an unrealistic utopia. 

I must say that it is one thing to say that there are significant powers outside of politics.  But it is another to say that politics is powerless.  And Jarvis, in my reading, is approaching saying that politics has no power.  

Although criticisms have been launched against deliberative politics, (justice and goodness are not the same, reasonableness is not truth, not everyone shares this view, etc.)  Jarvis proposes that 

It is in deliberative politics and practical reason that we find a basis for the learning society and lifelong learning.  (p. 174).

One of the issues that I'm considering at this point involves the direction from which Jarvis is addressing the relationship between politics and LLL.   What he is doing is assuming LLL to be a good and a goal and is asking which political concepts will serve as a basis for this.   In fact, LLL (in one definition) is being promoted and called for as never before BECAUSE of the contexts (economic more than political, although political is involved) in which we are living.  Chicken and egg?   
I can find some terms on which to address the difference.  Primarily, it is in what we choose to call a learning society.  It occurs to me throughout this reading that the term as it stands is useless.  Everyone means something different by it.  I think at least what is needed is a mandatory adjective.  I can think of at least 3 completely different visions of the learning society as it is being presented in this volume:

1. The political learning society.  As is being discussed in this section.  It is a society that engages its citizens with the knowledge, skills and opportunities to participate in the political.  It is considered an obvious good and is hoped to lead to justice and therefore, is something that we should try to develop.  Different political systems have different relationships to this idea of a learning society, and different mechanisms by which it might be achieved.  We want to get there.

2. The indoctrination learning society.  This is the passive learning society that Jarvis was suggesting is happening, whether we like it or not, when advertising and other forms of  uni-directional messages bombard citizens resulting in value and desire (re)creation in line with GC culture and consumerism.  This is something that we want to avoid, but according to Jarvis, are already involved in.  We are there.

3. The Employability/skills learning society.  Jarvis made some, but less reference to this learning society.  However, it is a major part of critical discourse on LLL and the KBE and is found well represented in policy documents such as those prepared by OECD and World Bank.  In this learning society, individual workers are saddled with the responsibility to continuously upgrade their skills or risk social exclusion and de-valuation in the labour market.  One author (whose reference I temporarily forget) referred to this as a state of perpetual inadequacy.  Policy is calling on workers to be responsible citizens and become the most skilled workers in the world so that they can help to advance the economies of the countries, regions and institutions in which they work.  While doing so, in terms relative to the industries, they receive little reward for their added efforts.  We are on the road, but don't want to get there. 

Before his final summary, Jarvis does take time to position new media technologies such as the Web as a cite of learning and an opportunity for an expansion of the agora and of civil society.  He suggest that these technologies may be offering new ways in which information can be shared, opinions voiced, debate enacted and deliberations expanded.  He reminds us that if these technologies are going to be successful in enhancing deliberative democracy, there will need to be mechanisms by which the resulting deliberations get fed into the political process. As these products become more ubiquitous, more will have access to this form of participation.   Jarvis does not raise the issue that only those with access and resources currently can involve themselves in this way.  Until then, other modes of participation are still needed.  And he also does not bring up what I believe is an important, if not ironic, point: 

If we do look to technologies such as the Web to provide a mechanism to breathe new life into deliberative democracy, are we not obliged to ask the path by which such technologies can become common place?  Will it not require the production, promotion and sales of computers to more people?  Will it not require that individuals will have to be persuaded to work hard and purchase these items?   Is it not ironic that, according to Jarvis, democracy is threatened by neo-liberal GC culture, and yet, a major solution for its health is a product of that neo-liberal GC culture? 

Just thinking out loud here.....I'd love to hear some other thoughts!

In the next chapter and blog, Jarvis will explore Utopian thought itself since he has positioned that the learning society is Utopian, and he hopes to later explore the type of learning contemporary society demands.

The Ethics of LLL and the Learning Society in Global Capitalist Society

Here, I summarize Chapter 8 of the same book by Peter Jarvis that I have been reviewing for the last week. 
Jarvis explains that scholars have had high hopes for the learning society, expecting that it would lead to

• a more democratic society
• a more ideal society
• a more just society 

(as defined by individual authors)

This chapter aims to do a critical analysis of LLL and the learning society in its current social context and show that modernity has not succeeded.  

Jarvis contrasts LLL as it is presented in two different policy documents: 

 

EU Policy Document (2001)	UNESCO “Delors” Report (1996)
Four aims for LLL: ·         Employability ·         Active citizenship ·         Social inclusion ·         Personal Fulfillment	Four Pillars of Learning: ·         Learning to do ·         Learning to be ·         Learning to work ·         Learning to live together

Jarvis claims that by reflecting on the differences between the aims, we can see that the EU is interested in individualism whereas UNESCO is concerned with the whole society.  Personally, I don't see that distinction in just these aims.  

This chapter will analyse the components of contemporary LLL and the Learning Society.  But first, Jarvis separates two strands of LLL.  

1. Recurrent education

• provided by the state or industry or private institutions
• periodic post-compulsory

2.   "Human Learning"  (ouch!  problematic name, I would say)

• other learning

HUMAN LEARNING

 Learning is ubiquitous.  Jarvis explores it in 3 modes: 

1. Informal LLL

• Our first learning, even pre-consciously, is learned informally and through relationships. 
• Jarvis repeats his prior arguments that learning is a moral activity, rooted in relationships and related to an ethic of concern for the other. 
• He seems to imply that informal LLL is non-cognitive and primarily sensual, but he doesn't actually say this.  He does say that non-cognitive, sensual learning is essential to human development. 
• Occurring in a GC culture, learning will likely reflect the values of a GC culture. 
• As free thinkers, we may reject some of those values

2. Non-formal LLL

• more organized/institutionalized, but outside of formal schooling
• could be experiential learning, learning from the media, or the hidden curriculum in formal schooling
• much of it is non-reflective learning  (passive acceptance) 
• some of the messages achieved through non-formal LLL (namely advertising) reflect questionable morality.
• Jarvis points out that the lack of morality in advertising does not imply the same problems with all non-formal LLL

3. Formal LLL

• Schools exist to prepare students for adulthood. 
• This implies that they exist FOR children and all of society.  
• GC culture is permeating schools and threatening this focus. 
• Jarvis suggests that the decline in standards and that this implies that the market has not improved education.  (Although he doesn't say it, Jarvis seems to be suggesting causality here:  that the market has harmed education.  Correlation is not cause.)
• He claims that education should be held to a different moral standard than advertising with regard to intentions of the teacher, techniques, content and the relationship to the truth
• He does not say that schools are failing to be different than advertising in these ways, but he does review some concerns he's presented regarding the hidden curriculum and commercial organizations' partnerships with schools.  
• He bemoans the reduction in liberal adult education and other forms of formal learning. 
• He notes that the content of formal LLL may not be addressing all the Pillars of Learning in the Delors Report: 

Citizenship education, human relationships and ecological education do not play significant roles in the practice of much formal lifelong learning. (p. 155). 

RECURRENT EDUCATION

..if education is so essential to human growth and development at one level and to career development at the other, then these functions have moral significance.  (p. 155).

• Jarvis critiques recurrent education for favouring the privileged. 
• The market implies that those who can afford to pay for LLL are worth more than those who cannot. 
• The provision of recurrent education market is one of competition (based on efficiency)
• He critiques provision for focusing on content that will lead to profit instead of enrichment. 
• Jarvis accepts that it is economically unfeasible for a state to fund recurrent education for all. 
• For those who engage for work related reasons, many (according to a study by Coffield [2000]) feel that their participation is not an opportunity but an obligation (refer to my use of the word "responsitunity" in a previous blog)  

...opportunities for lifelong learning were viewed by many of the participants in their study as a threat or an obligation imposed by employers rather than a promise... (p. 156). 

THE LEARNING SOCIETY

 

In the learning society in a GC culture, 

It is as if the higher ideals of education have been overtaken by the lower values of the market and the concept of the learning society...might be being used to hide the reality of the place of education in global capitalist society  (p. 157)

 

Jarvis contrasts 2 contemporary learning societies: 

The first, is the learning society of GC culture, where people learn to be compliant and flexible and accept the values of GC culture including the commodification of education.  

The other is reflected in "Europeanisation" which is "almost the complete antithesis" of the previous learning society.  In Europeanisation, people are learning to live together as a group, and not as individuals out for their own personal ends.  

Jarvis wonders if we may be experiencing a swing from sensate culture (see Sorokin:  a culture validated by the senses) to a more ideationalGC culture.   Jarvis reflects on some of the ways in which "people are beginning to become the ends rather than the means" (p. 158) and Jarvis sees these as harbingers of significant change. 

He concludes with a brief summary and the thought that the learning society as we now know it is a product of contemporary GC culture and its questionable values and suggests this is why some scholars are looking hopefully to the future where our learning society will be one more rooted in values that support the entire human condition and all of humanity.  

Tomorrows summary will be on Chapter 8: 

Democracy and the Learning Society

 

 The aim of the chapter is to examine the ideas of democracy.  He will conclude that in its 'pure' form, democracy cannot be realised as one might expect. He will be critical of its practicality and highlight Rawls' concerns for liberal democracy.  

 

 

•  

T

Ethics and Modernity

Nothing like a good discussion of ethics on a winter's day, eh?
Today I am summarizing the 7th Chapter from Jarvis' book

Ethics and Modernity

This should shake a few cages!  *grin*

Jarvis' purpose in this chapter is to find the basis for a learning society "which embodies goodness" and to understand the society that we now live in which has been called a learning society.  To do so, he first reviews 6 schools of thought on ethical value.  

Surely, in a few pages, Jarvis can't do justice to 6 schools of thought.  I certainly can't even do justice to Jarvis' arguments in a few paragraphs.  So, understand that what comes below necessarily leaves a great deal out.  These are just the barest bones. 

1. Deontology

• related to Kant and the idea that what is good is what a rational person would will to be universal law
• goodness relies in adherence to rules (universal ones, of course). 
• Has its critics: 
• (e.g.) when seated in a motive of obedience it's a cultural or legal value, not a moral one
• Rawls is more contemporary (1971) positioning justice as fairness
• also a legal and political concept more than a moral one
• Arendt (1958) relates ethics to forgiveness
• Jarvis argues that the principles of fairness and forgiveness are not aligned with the fundamental aims of capitalism.  In fact, when profit is gained at the expense of others, fairness is an obstacle.  
• Deontology does not, in Jarvis' view, provide a satisfactory ethical basis on which to construct a learning society.   
• I am not a student of philosophy, so I accept that I may be missing something important when I pose this question:  Does a system of rules and benefit ascribed based on adherance to those rules not sound in line with the workings of Global Capitalist Economics?  The rules may or may not be explicit, but it strikes me that when workers engage in lifelong learning in order to maintain their employability, they are then "playing by the rules of the game" are they not?  

2. Teleology

• With reference to Bentham (1978) Jarvis explains that this school of thought judges the moral good of an act based on the consequences of the act. 
• something is good if it leads to the most happiness for the most people. 
• There are criticisms:
• Does the ends always justify the means?  Was it "good" for Bonhoeffer to try to assascinate Hilter?  Would it have been good for someone to kill George W?
• Are motives not important in the ascription of moral good? 
• Are unintended "collateral casualities" (negative consequences) relevant to the valuation of good?
• Jarvis refers to the "underclass" as collateral caualities of consumer society. 
• How can we evaluate goodness when long- and short-term consequences are at odds? 
• Jarvis suggests that teleology is also an inadequate basis on which to establish goodness in a learning society. 

3. Intuitionism

• This represents the idea that "good" is not definable.  We just know it when we encounter it.  
• Has its critics: 
• even if one knows good, what compels one to do good?
• our interpretation of "good" changes with education and experience, so how can there be "a" good.? 
• One more school bites the dust. 

 4. Emotivism

• the idea here is that there is no such thing as good.  When we express that something IS good what we really mean is that we approve of it.   It's an expression of an emotion. 
• Critics:
• emotive may be stronger than reason:  and that just won't stand in modernity!
• emotions are confused with attitudes

5. Discourse Ethics

• Habermas (1990) developed this idea out of his theory of communicative action and ideal speech acts. (I won't review here but if you are unfamiliar and interested, the book is Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, and Wikipedia doesn't give a bad summary to start you off)
• It relates to the validation of truth claims in discourse by looking at the presuppositions in it. It attempts to rationally reconstruct moral insights and is based in a moral obligation of commuinctive rationality.  Validity of an ethical norm can only be established through dialectic argument. 
• requires ideal speech conditions (again, refer to theory of communicative action)
• Implies that we learn our ethics through communication with others. 
• Jarvis is attracted to this school because it positions discourse as learning.  We learn through communicative action (as opposed to strategic communication -- which we might label advertising). 
• Jarvis did not say this here, but I wonder if he is going to begin to develop an idea of a learning society in which learning is the continued interogation of morality through communicative discourse ethics. 
• One criticism is that not everyone is developed enough to engage in fruitful moral discourse. 

After reviewing these 5 schools of though, Jarvis quotes Bauman (1993, p. 247) and concludes that

Morality is not safe in the hands of reason (p. 132)

and that modernity is a condition of confused values where schools of thought on morality are inadequate to establish the concept of goodness in a lifelong learning society.   He does accept that political rules should be based on reason and judged by an ethic. And he proposes that the schools of thought reviewed here regarding "the good" are evidence that we are going to have to keep in mind the complexity of the meaning of ethical value in modernity where there is a complex relationship between the individual and the group.  

6. Agapism (situation ethics)

• Jarvis positions Agapism separate from the other schools.  
•  from a Greek word for love it positions that the only universal moral good 
• concern for the Other, without a concern for self-interests, is always good
• (this is the antithesis of modernity)
• other versions of "good" either overly emphasise the individual or the group
• emphasizing the individual threatens to have us lose sight of our responsibility to each other. 
• We always exist in relationships.  Relationships come first. 
• emphasizing the group threatens to have us lose sight of our individual humanity
• "...one's humanity is simultaneously shared and singular." (Jackson, 2005, p. 43). 
• Agapism focuses on the relationship, and therefore negotiates between the individual and the whole.
• Jarvis claims that his arguments suggest that it is impossible to locate moral good in behaviour or reason because they cannot both protect the individual and the whole.
•  He refers to the "Delors Report" (1996) in which UNESCO positions 4 "pillars" of learning, one of which is "learning to live together."  Jarvis suggests that only an agapist ethic can fulfill that pillar.
•  He admits to a utopican vision where everyone exercises
  

 both concern and freedom in a resonsible manner for the good of the whole and, as a result, all individuals grow, develop and fulfil their own human potential in relationship--what Levinas refers to as Infinity.(p 137)

•  The purpose of a utopian vision such as this is to remind us that we've not achieved perfection 

The City of Man, or the New Jerusalem...cannot be achieved through the ideas of modernity which endeavoured to construct it through individual effort and knowledge (p. 137). 

Jarvis then discusses stages of moral development.  He positions moral development as learning, specifically, as a form of lifelong learning. But he argues that although conceptualizing moral values is a developmental process, learning them through experience is not. 

Jarvis then refects back on previous chapters reviewing the values of modernity so that he can analyze them from the theoretical and developmental perspectives in the present chapter.    He warns that this section would require another book to do it justice, but his (and my subsequuent) review are limited by space and time.  

Scientific Knowledge

The claim that scientific knowledge is value-free is overly simplistic.  Once meaning is introduced to a fact, values are involved.  

Capitalism

• Capitalism is telogical
• "..the pursuit of profit by rational and legal means and, as such, fucntions at a low level of moral development in Kohlberg's scheme [of moral development]" (p. 140)  
• See http://faculty.plts.edu/gpence/html/kohlberg.htm 
• He posits some of the collateral causualities of capitalism including
• impoverishment of workers 
• I have to take some exception here.  "poverty" compared to what?  Compared to no work?  communism?  some other ideal agapist society?  Is poverty not being measured in the terms set by capitalism itself?  In other words, am I impoverished if I can't afford a new car, granite counter tops in my kitchen, vacations, jewellery, perfume etc?  I think it a little like speaking out of the other side of your mouth to suggest that a social ill is created when people don't have the products of the system you aim to condemn.  
• impoverishment of suppliers 
• I have similar concerns with this argument.  Are the suppliers not part of the capitalist network, and thus positioned to make profit as well? 
• addiction to consumerism
• My issue with this claim is only that we are conditioned into a state of perpetual want-overload and have-deficit.  "Addiction to conusmerism" and other such statements seems to position consumerism as a given evil "just because it sounds like it's evil"  I need a little more evidence than that. 
•  Profit is the single goal, but it is not the only outcome and it is not a moral good. 
• the profit of the few is often at the expense of the many. 
• The means by which profit is maximized are sometimes morally questionable.
• means that try to obtain raw materials as cheaply as possible without human or environmental considerations
• means of lowering production costs that impact the wages and working conditions of workers
• means of selling at high prices by driving up the perceived need or reducing supply
• means of selling more through mis-information and persuasive techniques. 

Freedom

• Freedom has to be limited and used responsibily in order for one person's freedom to not impinge upon another's. 
• in this way, the utilitarian position on morality is weak and the deontological position must be qualified. 
• From the communicative action perspective, freedom is something that is debateable in ethical discourse. 
• From the agapistic position, the existence of the Other impinges on my freedom, and that is where ethics and care for the other begins.
• modernity downplays the freedom of the Other. 

Individualism

•   Individualism itself isn't a problem.  We are individuals and it is as individuals that we can accept accept personal moral responsibility to have concern for others.   (This is a bit of an embellishment on what Jarvis is saying, but I don't think he'd disagree) 
• The problem with modernity is that it fails to adequately address the dual and complex nature of humans both as individuals and as a collective.  It needs to better integrate the concept of relationship, where the role of the individual is in relation, and where we all are born and live our lives. 
• Whereas Jarvis is clear that the focus in modernity is on individualism, and I can't deny that to a large degree, there is one other observation that I think is relevant and should be included.  In a great many supra-national and national policy documents on LLL, the individual is indeed "saddled" with the responsibility of continual up-skilling. But there is an undercurrent text that suggests that he or she must do so as a valuable citizen.  LLL is positioned as a moral responsibility to the group.  LLL is not so much an opportunity for the individual himself, but rather a responsibility to society and the economy.  I've called this a "responsitunity" because it has appeared to me as though the discourse is blending the two and where the individual ends and the society begins is not always clear. 

Rationality

•  Jarvis argues that although rat
• ionality is good, it is not sufficient to establish a morality. 
• We are not entirely rational 
• Concern for others, particularly when there are no self-interests involved, is not said to be rational. 

Pragmatism

•  Pragmatism is open to future learning, and therefore, can incorporate a LLL society. 

 Jarvis concludes by saying that "...global capitalism is not built on the value of moral goodness but on the otehr values of modernity..." as outlined above. 
He then goes on to pose questions about the morality of actions within a GC culture such as:

What of the advertising executive who produces advertisements that tare deliberately misleading? 

What of the employees of teh tocacco company who continue to work for hte company...?

What of the policy maker who deliberately prevents people from obtaining their traditinal rights by privatising community faciliteis such as water in parts of central Africa? 

He explains that although he cannot answer these questions, he suggests that theorists have wrestled with the responsibility of those who are just conforming to a system that is flawed.  (as all systems are) 

He concludes with   "If neo-liberalism is the logiacl outcome of modernity, then morally and politically it has failed."  (p. 148) 

The City of Man cannot be built on the values of neo-liberalism.  But this is where we find that LLL has become a dominant idea.   

In the next chapter, which I summarize tomorrow, Jarvis specifically looks at the ethics of LLL in a GC Society.  

He begins:

Our intention is to continue this critical analysis and place lifelong learning within its current social context, one that suggests that modernity has not succeeded, and then look beyond to what could be.  

 

•  

Indoctrination and the Learning Society

This is a summary of the 6th chapter of Peter Jarvis' book. 

In the previous chapter, Jarvis presented the information society and LLL as reflecting the bombardment of information upon the masses with uni-directional input which acculturates individuals into and supports a Global Capitalist (GC) culture.   He points out here that this is a different presentation than is usually presented in general discussion or in academic discourse.  LLL usually suggests the continuous up-grading of one's knowledge and skills in order to enhance one's employability.  Here Jarvis suggests that this is really 2 sides of the same coin. 

Side 1:  LLL = learning to be consumers
Side 2:  LLL = learning to be employable

Side 2 enables Side 1.  When employed, you make money that can allow you to be a consumer.  Furthermore, You are involved in the production of more goods to consume.

Side 1 enables Side 2.  As a consumer whose desires are being (re)created over and over to desire more things, one must remain employable in order to get these things.

The forms of knowledge that are promoted by the core of the GC Culture are those that support the GC Culture and its interests.  Indeed, there are other knowledges, but as GC Culture communication increasingly dominates our learning, other knowledges that promote other values and interests are increasingly set off to the side. 

...the concepts of lifelong learning and the learning society are social constructions, biased to reflect those aspects of global capitalism that are seen to be essential to its perpetuation....the forms of learning to which we are exposed in everyday life...are indoctrinating and the type of society that we call a learning society is actually quite totalitarian.  (p. 109)

Jarvis provides a distinction between indoctrination, brainwashing and thought reform. 

Indoctrination: 

• a form of socialization
• individuals have little consent to exposure to the information
• teaches to accept doctrines uncritically
• "implanting" of ideas

 Brainwashing:

• involves more radical changes in ideas or beliefs
• based on "conditioning" techniques
• "implanting" ideas
• more than just cognitive:  may incorporate bodily senses and emotions

Thought reform:

• more of a re-education

In all 3, little critical power is afforded to the learners.  They are passive recipients and in a sense, not free in that regard.  In fact, he refers to learning as "non-consensual" instead of suggesting that the degree to which learning is consensual is not absolute.  I would like to have seen a little more inclusion of agency in this discussion, but I believe based on earlier chapters, that this meta-freedom is somewhat implied.   What Jarvis is trying to point out is that in spite of our feeling of freedom/agency, we are being influenced in ways that we are not explicitly aware of or identifying.   When bombarded by advertising aimed at creating desire and value, "...we appear to act freely according to our desires, we are actually demonstrating the power of the brain-washing process" (p. 110).

Jarvis calls on Wilson (1964) in describing communication as NOT indoctrination when it is rational where "rational communication consists in not putting pressure on an individual in a way which his conscious mind cannot fully resist" (Wilson, p. 33).    Jarvis claims that advertising lowers the resistance of many, and therefore, is instrumental in indoctrination.    In education, truth, evidence and reality are "primary means of communication" whereas they are secondary in indoctrination. He reminds us that advertising in a GC Culture is aimed at conformity, and those that don't conform often suffer consequences.

He goes on to differentiate and compare definitions of propaganda with each other and with notions of indoctrination.  Whatever the definition, he tries to make the point that much advertising in a GC culture presents information is such was as to make it difficult for an individual to make a truly free (problematic term, but grant me a little latitude) valuation and decision about products.  A learning society which promoted more critically reflective review of information is more in line with education and not indoctrination.

He goes on to make the point under 5 headings:

• Intentions of those transmitting the information

Jarvis provides examples to illustrate that intent of advertisers is more than simply providing information or encouraging sales. He shows that at least in one specific example of a large cereal manufacturer in the UK which opposes a new labelling program for its foods, we can see an exercise of economic and persuasive power aimed at affecting how people receive information about products.

• Techniques employed in information transmission

Jarvis claims that "very sophisticated psychological techniques" are used in advertising. These include the elicitation of emotion, repetition, and techniques which affect the pre-conscious mind.

• Contents of the information

"If commodities were to be purchased for their use-value only, then we could expect that information about hem would be presented in a rational manner" (p. 115).   In GC Culture, exchange-value supersedes use-value and products are coupled with a variety of illusions and socially desirable phenomena.  Advertisements for soap that call upon exotic images are hardly selling based on rational arguments.

• Relationship to the Truth

Science is seen as an authority legitimizing claims to truth. We find that advertisements often use scientific semiotics which associate the product with this authority.  They will often use mis-leading or un-proven claims.  Once a product is valuated in terms of exchange-value instead of use-value, the bases on which an item is valued is more subjective and can float far from objective truth.

• Morality

Jarvis foreshadows later chapters in which he addresses this complex notion in more detail.  oh!  that will be fun! 

Jarvis lists the 8 criteria Lifton (1961) has named as indicative of totalism.  Of those eight, five have already been highlighted in his discussion of GC culture and advertising. I won't go into explaining the criteria or how they've been demonstrated here.  Those interested can see Lifton's Thought Control and the Psychology of Totalism.  

Jarvis then discusses Levinas' approach to totalism (1991) in which the structures are seen as the totalism which have the potential to destroy individuality and human freedom.  Levinas focuses on relationships. Totalist structures make the Other into a stranger, which invokes a different ethic than when the Other is experienced as "a Face".  Totalisers seek to reduce individual responsibility to the other by grouping individuals.  We see this sort of grouping in learning society literature (Lave & Wenger, 1991) and in organizational studies (Senge, 1990). Systems are emphasized, not individuals.

Tomorrow I will summarize the 7th Chapter entitled:

Ethics and Modernity 

which has the stated goal of 

...find(ing) a basis for a learning society which embodies goodness